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ABSTRACT Existing power cyber-physical system (CPS) risk prediction results are inaccurate as they fail 
to reflect the actual physical characteristics of the components and the specific operational status. A new 
method based on dependent Markov chain for power CPS risk area prediction is proposed in this paper. The 
load and constraints of the non-uniform power CPS coupling network are first characterized, and can be 
utilized as a node state judgment standard. Considering the component node isomerism and 
interdependence between the coupled networks, a power CPS risk regional prediction model based on 
dependent Markov chain is then constructed. A cross-adaptive gray wolf optimization algorithm improved 
by adaptive position adjustment strategy and cross-optimal solution strategy is subsequently developed to 
optimize the prediction model. Simulation results using the IEEE 39-BA 110 test system verify the 
effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method.   
INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical system, Markov chain, risk region prediction, cross-adaptive grey wolf 
optimization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The development of an increasing number of varied energy 
sources requires the traditional power system to connect 
with a variety of cyber systems such as computing 
equipment, communication devices, and sensors. As a 
result, the cyber-physical power system has become 
increasingly complex and multi-dimensional [1]. This tight 
interconnection not only provides support for data analysis 
and intelligent control decisions by power systems, but also 
means the grid is more dependent on the cyber network. 
The security of cyber systems therefore significantly affects 
the stable operation of the power system [2]. Attacks on 
cyber networks have caused large-scale power outages in 
numerous incidents at home and abroad, such as the cases 
detailed in [3]-[5]. Therefore, it is of great importance to 
reduce the system risk and improve the stability of the 
cyber-physical system (CPS) by simulating the risk 
propagation process and predicting the possible affected 
risk area promptly and accurately after the cyber network is 
attacked [6]. 
At present, two aspects are the main focus of research into 
the risk propagation process and prediction method of the 
cyber physical system. Firstly, graph theory and percolation 
theory are utilized to analyze the risk propagation and 
development process from the perspective of physical 
characteristics such as network topology. Reference [7] 
analyzed the risk propagation process in power systems of 
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small-world effects. It was found that the risk was 
concentrated in the high clustering area, and a strategy was 
developed to mitigate the damage of network faults. The risk 
propagation process was explored in [8] by adjusting 
network topologies such as node degree and degree 
distribution of the network. The authors in [9] used the 
method of cellular automata to compare the power 
information physical system to physical cells and information 
cells, and established the security based on cellular automata 
through the relationship between the normal and fault states 
of the two cells. The system risk propagation process was 
simulated from the perspective of characteristics of load flow 
operation in the system in [10]-[13]. The real-time operating 
state of the system was then analyzed based on the node load 
optimization reconfiguration process and the impact of the 
cyber routing strategy, power network load flow calculation, 
and coupled network on risk diffusion and propagation was 
explored. A risk prediction method was then proposed based 
on complex networks. The authors considered the functions 
undertaken by the power information system, using the 
monitoring and control failure model to evaluate the 
reliability of the power information physical system in [14]-
[15]. 
B. RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
Although a large body of research has been conducted on 
power CPS risk prediction, some limitations remain and are 
detailed in this subsection. A lot of specific operation 
processes of the power cyber-physical system are simplified 
in research of the propagation process based on the network 
topology structure, which ignores the coupling relationship 
and interaction influence between the power network and the 
cyber state. The propagation trend of power CPS risk cannot 
be accurately simulated by simply coupling the cyber node 
and the power node in a one-to-one manner. Most existing 
research based on system load flow operation focuses on the 
overall grasp of load flow characteristics, often ignoring the 
specific physical properties of different component nodes and 
their real-time status information due to the excessively large 
and complex structural characteristics of power cyber-
physical systems. As a result, the prediction results are 
inaccurate. 
C. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The main contributions of this paper are outlined as follows. 
• A risk area prediction model for power CPS is 
formulated by considering the effects of load 
reconfiguration between nodes in the same network and 
the interdependence between the coupled networks. 
This model is more accurately reflects the actual system 
risk propagation process. 
· A cross-adaptive grey wolf optimization based on 
crossover strategy is proposed. Adaptive degree position 
adjustment strategy and cross optimal solution strategy 
are then introduced to enhance the efficiency and 
accuracy of the grey wolf optimization result. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The load 
and constraints of the non-uniform power CPS coupling 
network are formally characterized in Section II. In Section 
III, the risk area prediction model for power CPS is 
constructed, which can distinguish different node properties 
and capture the interdependence between the coupled 
networks. The proposed cross-adaptive gray wolf 
optimization algorithm (CAGWO) is presented in Section IV, 
and the simulation experiment is explained and results are 
outlined and discussed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in Section VI. 
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF NETWORK LOAD AND 
CONSTRAINTS OF NON-UNIFORM POWER CPS 
As each node in the real power cyber-physical system carries 
loads with actual physical meaning, the cyber node is 
responsible for transmitting the information flow and the 
physical network node is responsible for transmitting the 
current. The loads carried by these nodes are related to its 
elements such as location and material properties, and it is 
difficult to determine the actual node load for research and 
simulation. Therefore, in the research of this paper, the load 
model calculated by combining the network topology and the 
operating characteristics is employed to replace the real load. 
Additionally, the improved ball warehouse model is used to 
non-uniformly distribute the coupling part in order to achieve 
formal characterization of the physical fusion of power 
information. 
A. CYBER FLOW LOAD AND CONSTRAINT 
CHARACTERIZATION 
A single cyber is represented by Gc=(Vc,Ec), where Vc 
represents a set of nodes and Ec represents a set of edges. The 
total load of the cyber per unit time can be described as: 
                              
(1) 
Among them, it is believed that the faulty physical 
network node is not monitored and controlled by the cyber 
node, so Vp-normal is the normal working set in the physical 
network, lnj is the node degree of the physical network node j 
in time step n, and α and δ are random variables used to 
control the load of the cyber to the normal working node in 
the physical network. The cyber flow load only includes the 
structural load of the cyber, while specific service 
classifications are ignored. 
The load LC nj of the cyber node j in time step n is: 
                             
(2) 
where Vp-normal is the normal working node in the cyber, dni 
is the node degree of the cyber node j in the time step n, and 
θ is the influence factor of the cyber node bearing the load. 
When θ>0, the bigger the node degree, the greater the load 
it bears. 
At the same time, because the load that the cyber node 
can bear is limited, once a cyber node is attacked, a large 
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number of data streams will flow into the unified node, 
causing the buffer of the node device to overflow and 
packet loss. At this time, the cyber node cannot transmit the 
cyber stream normally. The constraint of the cyber node is: 
                           
(3) 
where ρc is the tolerance coefficient of the cyber node and 
LC 0j is the load connected to the node j before system 
failure. 
B. PHYSICAL NETWORK LOAD AND CONSTRAINT 
CHARACTERIZATION 
A single power network is represented by Gc=(Vc,Ec), where 
Vp represents a set of nodes and Ep represents a set of edges. 
There are three types of nodes in a physical network: a 
power generation node that produces electrical energy, a 
load node that consumes electrical energy, and a substation 
node that neither produces nor consumes electrical energy. 
As the power consumption of the cyber node is much 
smaller than the total power consumption of the entire 
network, the impact of the cyber on the power network load 
can be ignored. 
The load LP nh of the physical network node h in time 
step n is: 
                                   (4) 
where β and µ are random variables and l0h is the node 
degree of the physical network node h at the initial moment. 
Similarly, as a physical network node transmitting electrical 
energy, once a fault occurs, the loads carried by it are 
redistributed and transferred to its neighbor nodes. During 
this period, one or more nodes may bear more load than 
their capacity and thus cannot transmit power normally. The 
constraint of physical network nodes is: 
                        (5) 
C. ESTABLISHMENT CYBER-PHYSICAL COUPLING OF 
NON-UNIFORM INTERDEPENDENCE 
The nodes in the cyber network are divided into monitoring 
function nodes and control function nodes according to the 
"k-n" model [16]. The control node performs calculation 
and generates operation of the cyber system directly by 
monitoring the cyber system uploaded by the node to the 
physical network, and each node in the physical network is 
governed by the control node. At the same time, all nodes in 
the cyber network can also obtain power from the physical 
network. The coupling correspondence is shown in Fig. 1. 
Gc
Gp
 
FIG. 1 CPS coupling model for non-uniform power 
If the node in the physical network fails, it cannot 
provide sufficient power to the cyber network. In the cyber 
network, important nodes and links will often have backup 
devices. If important node or link interruptions occur, their 
services can be transferred to the backup device. Therefore, 
important services can usually be recovered quickly, while 
other nodes that are not backed up will perform dynamic 
cyber distribution, which will be assigned to adjacent 
normal working nodes. This process may cause additional 
node failures as some nodes may undertake more cyber 
after redistribution than their assumed limits. 
Studying the initial workload and capacity of the 
power network nodes shows that the number of cyber 
nodes that a power node can assume is limited. Therefore, 
the ball-slot model based on the infinite capacity of all 
power nodes in the existing literature [17] is not accurate 
and it is necessary to improve the ball-slot allocation 
method to construct a more reasonable coupling network. 
Assuming that the maximum number of cyber nodes 
that a power node can support is related to its initial load, 
then: 
                                (6) 
The average maximum is: 
             (7) 
Assuming that the nodes in Gp are marble bines, the 
nodes in Gc are balls, and the sizes of Gp and Gc are Sp and 
Sc, respectively, then the selectable position of the ball is 
Sp<Nz>, and Pz d represents the probability distribution of 
the degree of node. Thus, the probability of assigning the 
ball to the initial load Lnz is: 
                             (8) 
Defining the number of balls in the initial load Lnz marble bin as 
the random variable ω, then: 
   (9) 
where lnz is the node degree of node z in time step n. In 
addition, if the number of balls in a marble bin is defined as 
a random variable, then: 
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             (10) 
III. RISK AREA PREDICTION MODEL FOR POWER CPS 
The process of risk propagation can be considered as the 
development of a series of conditional probability events. 
The Markov process chain can describe the state change of 
these random events and the transition law between them. It 
can also predict the trend of events according to the 
transition probability between the initial state and the 
related state of the system. By combining the two, they can 
be used to describe and analyze the power CPS network 
risk propagation events with randomness and correlation. 
A. ANALYSIS OF RISK BROADCAST PROCESS 
CONSIDERING NETWORK INTERACTION 
In a Markov process of a single network, the state of the 
system at each moment is only related to a state at a 
previous moment. By setting the state space of the system 
at time i to Si, the system needs i time steps to transform 
from the initial state S0 to Si through a series of state 
transitions, and the whole conversion process is combined 
by {C1, C2,...,Cm}. Thus, the system comprehensive state 
transition probability is: 
 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1
                , ,
            
                
mC C C
m m m m
m m m m
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P C s C s C s C s
P C s P C s C s
P C s C s
− − − −
− −
= =  = =  
 = = = =  
= =  = =  
 = =  
  (11) 
However, for a power cyber-physical system composed 
of a cyber network and a physical network coupling, the 
total state space of the system is determined by the states of 
two networks, and one system node state change not only 
affects the neighboring nodes of the same network, but also 
the state of the nodes in the other network through the 
coupling component. The specific interaction process 
between system states is illustrated in Fig. 2.  
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FIG. 2 Status interaction process of cyber and physical network 
The cyber system state space with time step n is 
represented by SAn and the physical system state space of 
time step n is represented by SBn. 
1) When n=0, there are ten cyber nodes in the cyber 
system state space Sa0, including one failed node 2, and six 
normal running physical nodes in the physical system state 
space Sb0. This system state is shown in Fig. 2(a). 
2) When n=1, the state of the system node is judged. As 
node 2 in the cyber system is connected to the physical 
network node 1 through the coupling network, when cyber 
node 2 fails, the physical node 1 and its connected line are 
also affected and invalidated. 
3) When n=2, the physical network sub-node fails and is 
removed, causing the failure of cyber node 3 through lost 
the power supply, and deleting the failed node and the 
corresponding line. This process is shown in Fig. 2(c). 
4) When n=3 and above, the state of the dual-network 
system interacts and transforms until the network resumes 
its steady state. 
It can therefore be observed that for the power cyber-
physical coupling system, the system state at each moment 
may be related to multiple states at the previous moment 
and the single Markov chain probability framework is no 
longer applicable. In this work, two single heterogeneous 
Markov chains are combined to form a dependent Markov 
chain model, and the interactive transformation method is 
employed to capture the interdependence between the 
coupled networks. The cyber and physical network status 
and their corresponding transition probabilities are 
considered simultaneously when judging the system state 
space at a certain moment. The calculation formula of the 
system comprehensive state transition probability in the 
coupled network is then: 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1
{
               
 
 }
                {
           }      
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 = =        
  (12) 
B. RISK AREA PREDICTION MODEL BASED ON 
INTERDEPENDENT MARKOV CHAIN 
1) SYSTEM FULL STATE SPACE 
The system full state space in the correlation Markov chain 
probability framework combines the cyber and physical 
network state space. The particularity of the interaction 
between the networks is taken into consideration and an 
auxiliary variable is also added to track the process of 
interaction of two network nodes between states. The 
resulting full state space Sn of the power CPS system is 
characterized as follows: 
 ( ), , , ,n n n n n nS X I Y L K  
in which n is the total number of time steps for measuring 
the state change process during the risk propagation process. 
For state variables of the power grid, Xn is the physical 
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network failure number, In is the network stability index, 0 
means it is unstable in the transition state, and 1 refers to 
stable operation in the absorption state. Additionally, Yn is  
the number of failures of the cyber, Ln is the auxiliary 
variable, capturing the direction of transition in the cross-
domain staggered framework, 0 means that the last faulty 
node is in the grid, and 1 means that it is in the cyber state. 
Finally, Kn maps the history to the node of the last 
conversion through the quantization function and 
determines whether it is faulty. 
2) STATE TRANSITION PROBABILITY OF DUAL 
NETWORK INTERACTION 
The main reason for system state transition in the power 
cyber-physical coupling network is the load optimization 
reconfiguration caused by the node tolerance and the 
interaction of the dual network nodes through the coupling 
component. A state transition probability calculation 
method capable of capturing this relationship is proposed 
in this work. The recovery probability of the individual 
network is used to estimate the state transition probability 
of the whole system. First, the system state is divided into 
two categories: absorption state and transition state. 
Absorption state means that the load carried by all nodes in 
the network is below the constraint value. The system is in 
a stable running state at this time. Once this state is entered, 
the risk propagation is terminated and the system state is 
no longer changed. The transition state means that there is 
a node in the system that runs beyond the load constraint. 
Such a node may be cut off due to failure and the load it 
carries will be reassigned to its neighbors, triggering 
propagation of the node's risk state. 
The probability that the physical network and the cyber  
state are restored to the absorption state from the transition 
state is represented by p(x) and q(y), respectively, where 
the variables x and y are the number of fault nodes 
exceeding the normal capacity in the physical network and 
the cyber, respectively. The degree of influence of the 
cyber state on the stable operation of the physical network 
is represented by the influence function d, and its 
expression is: 
 d : 0,1,2, , [0,1]Cm →  
where mc represents the number of faulty component nodes 
in routers, switches, and cyber nodes in the cyber system. 
The range of d is between 0 and 1. The value from large to 
small corresponds to the impact of cyber system failure on 
the power grid from strong to weak. 
The state transition process in the coupled network is 
described below based on the dependent Markov 
probability framework to construct the propagation 
dynamics equation. In this process, it is assumed that the 
initial failed node appears in the cyber, and the failure node 
transmission within the network during the load 
reconfiguration transfer process and the interaction between 
the networks in the coupling relationship are considered. 
The system state transition probability at the next moment 
is obtained as follows: 
1) When Kn=0, that is, the system as a whole is in the 
absorption state, the internal node will run stably without 
state transition, then the next time Kn+1=0, Sn+1=Sn, state 
transition probability p(Sn→Sn+1)=1; 
2) When Kn=1, the system as a whole is in a transition 
state. 
① If the new failed node appears in the cyber state at 
time n+1, the state transition probability expression is: 
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
0
     
11
nn
n n
nn
Kq y
P S S
Kq y
+
+
+
=  
→ =  
=−  
         (13) 
the risk continues to propagate and the system is still 
in the transition state; 
② If the new failed node appears in the physical 
network along with the coupling network at time n+1, 
the state transition probability expression is: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
1
1
1
1  0
1
     1
1
n n
n
n n n
n n
n n
n
n n n
p x d y
K
k d y k
P S S
p x d y
K
k d y k
+
+
+

− =
+ −
→ = 
 =
 + −
         (14) 
3) RISK AREA PREDICTION MODEL BASED ON 
INTERDEPENDENT MARKOV CHAIN 
The system full state space obtained in the foregoing and 
the state transition probability under different conditions 
are combined in Eq. (11). At the same time, in order to 
simplify the system state, let X(x, y) denote the asymptotic 
probability when the system state returns to the absorption 
state, Y(x, y) represents the asymptotic probability when 
the system state is still in the transition state, and the 
following recursive equation is obtained by derivation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 1 -1
3 1 -1
, , , + , ,
                 + , ,
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i
X x y x y X x y x y X x y
x y X x y
 

− −
−
=      (15) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4 1 5 1 1, , , , ,i i i i i i i i i iY x y x y X x y x y Y x y − − −= +           (16) 
where xi and yi represent the number of fault nodes of the 
physical network and the information network at time i, 
respectively, and other coefficients are: 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
1
1
1
1 1
,
i i i
i i
i
p x q y p x
x y
p x

−
−
− −
=
                        (17) 
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1
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
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− −
−               (18) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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1
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( )( )
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1
4
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1-
, =
i
i i
i
p x
x y
p x

−
−
                                                (20) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )5 1 1 1, = 1 1i i i i i i ix y q y p x d y d y p x − − −− − −         (21) 
The power CPS risk area prediction model based on the 
dependent Markov chain is thus obtained. The model 
extracts and estimates the parameters by analyzing the 
historical data on the basis of capturing the interaction of 
the two networks, then calculates the probability of 
occurrence of the risk region containing different nodes 
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using Eq. (16). The iteration number of the recursive 
equation is then taken as the order of failure of each node. 
IV. CROSS-ADAPTIVE GRAY WOLF OPTIMIZATION 
SOLUTION ALGORITHM 
As is difficult to obtain effective prediction results by direct 
calculation using the recursive equation obtained above, a 
gray wolf optimization with fast convergence and 
parallelism is selected for the optimal solution of the 
problem. At the same time, because the solution domain of 
the risk region model has wide and multi-peak 
characteristics, the traditional gray wolf optimization 
method is prone to premature converge into local optimum 
in the process of solving this kind of model. 
 Due to the above-mentioned shortcomings, an adaptive g
rey wolf optimization based on crossover strategy is propos
ed in this study. The adaptive degree position adjustment str
ategy and cross optimal solution strategy are introduced to e
nhance the efficiency and accuracy of the grey wolf optimiz
ation result. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF ADAPTIVE GREY WOLF 
OPTIMIZATION FOR CROSSOVER STRATEGY 
In the early stage of optimization of the grey wolf 
algorithm, it is difficult to control the search direction of 
the wolves. In addition, population diversity is prone to 
restriction, and the optimization results become limited to a 
single solution problem. Improvements to the strategy are 
proposed as follows: 
1) Adaptive position adjustment strategy: 
To determine the most suitable convergence speed, self-
adaptive adjustment strategy is adopted to adjust the gray 
wolf position in the initial stage by comparing the current 
fitness value with the mean value of the wolf group fitness. 
The expression is as follows: 
( )
1 2 3
1 2 3
   
1
           
3
i j z
n avg
i j z
n avg
k W k W k W
k k
k k k
W t
W W W
k k
+ +

+ +
+ = 
+ +

          (22) 
where W(t+1) represents the spatial azimuth coordinates of 
the gray wolf after the t-th iteration, t is the number of 
iterations, and W1, W2, and W3 are the distances of the gray 
wolves whose current gray wolf positions are 1, 2, and 3 
respectively. Additionally, kn and kavg respectively represent 
the current individual fitness and the reciprocal of the mean 
fitness, and ki, kj, and kz correspond to the reciprocal of the 
fitness of these grey wolves, respectively. 
2) Cross-optimal solution strategy: 
A cross-over strategy is proposed which uses the 
iteratively updated position-to-space coordinates to cross-
correlate with the optimal population to screen out the 
location of the mutated population that leads to a single 
species of the population. The speed and position of each 
particle is determined using the following expression: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1i iW t W t W t W t   + = + −             (23) 
where Wi(t+1) and Wi(t) are the spatial coordinates of the 
individual wolves after resetting the local optimal solution, 
W (t) is the current optimal solution, γ is a random value in 
the range from the absolute value [1,2], and β is a random 
value in the range [0,1], which is used to provide random 
fitness to define the attractiveness between the population 
and the prey. 
B. MODEL SOLUTION STEPS 
The adaptive gray group optimization algorithm 
considering the crossover strategy works to add the fitness 
adjustment and the optimal solution set cross-correlation 
process to the approach of the original algorithm and to 
surround the prey. This process works to avoid the problem 
of random distribution of the population which can easily 
fall into the local optimum. The steps to solve the power 
CPS risk area prediction model using the adaptive grey 
wolf optimization algorithm of cross strategy are as follows: 
1) Parameter initialization: The load and constraints are 
formally characterized according to the topology structure 
of the power CPS system and the tidal running parameters, 
and all nodes in the dual network operate normally. 
2) Adaptive gray wolf initialization of the cross strategy: 
The individual size is set, the corresponding spatial position 
coordinates of the head wolf, the auxiliary wolf, and the 
subordinate wolf are selected, and the failure probability of 
each node is taken as the fitness value coefficient. 
3) Simulate the system risk propagation process by using 
state transition probability: The initial information network 
fails node and the trigger system moves into a transition 
state. The initial system-wide state space is generated and 
the system's comprehensive state transition probability is 
calculated by considering the node load constraint, the 
degree of front-to-back state correlation, and the 
influencing factors of the coupled network. 
4) Construct a risk-region prediction model for the 
dependent Markov chain: A risk area prediction model 
considering the specific attributes of the components and 
the operating state is established according to the 
constraints and the simulation process. 
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Start
Initialize the individual position of the gray wolf population, and the 
values of W1, W2, W3, the number of iterations t=0
Deal with the transboundary grey wolf individual, calculate the fitness 
value of each individual, and obtain the fitness mean value kavg
Update W1, W2, W3 after 
iteration
Calculate the individual optimal solution and 
update the current gray wolf individual position
Use the reset local optimal solution strategy to obtain the region that can 
make the gray wolf individual jump out of the local optimal solution, t=t+1
t>tmax
Output optimal solution Wμ and 
optimal fitness value 1/kα 
End
Yes
No
 
FIG. 3 Flowchart of the cross-adaptive gray wolf optimization solution 
algorithm process 
 
5) Describe the optimization process: The individual 
fitness value is calculated according to the constraint 
condition and the risk region transfer process. The fitness 
values of the head wolf, the auxiliary wolf, and the 
subordinate wolf are also determined. An adaptive degree 
position adjustment strategy and a cross optimal solution 
strategy are then introduced to update the current optimal 
individual and the global optimal individual. 
6) Whether the end condition is satisfied is assessed, and 
if it is satisfied, the output of the global optimal solution is 
ended, otherwise jump to Step 3). 
The cross-adaptive gray wolf optimization solution 
algorithm process is illustrated in Fig. 3 
V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT AND DISCUSSION 
A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT DESIGN 
The experimental environment was constructed by 
designing the physical layer, cyber layer, and the coupling 
relationship as the research object [6].  
The physical layer builds an abstract network topology 
diagram based on the standard IEEE 39 bus system  model 
and abstracts the generators, transformers, and other 
devices into physical nodes. The transmission lines between 
the devices are abstracted as edges, and the direction of the 
edges is not considered.  
The cyber layer selection establishes a 110-node scale-
free network based on the Barabasi-Albert model. The 
parameters are set as m0=3, m=2, and the average node 
degree <k> is 4. 
The connection between the two layers employs the 
improved bin and ball allocation method in Section 1.3 to 
establish a non-uniform coupling connection. The line load 
factor is δ=θ=μ=2 and the tolerance coefficient ρc = ρp = 0.5 . 
According to these parameters, a 149-node power cyber 
information physical system was built with IEEE 39-BA 
110. The model was comprised of 39 physical nodes and 
110 information nodes, 46 physical lines, 92 information 
lines, and 70 coupling branches. Some network structures 
are outlined as follows: 
30
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9 25
41
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13
24
23
Cyber node
Physical node
 
FIG. 4 Node and line connection topology 
B. ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLES 
The CPS coupling network IEEE 39-BA 110 was selected 
for analysis. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed 
prediction method, the following two steps were taken to 
analyze the example: 1) Power CPS risk predictive model 
validity analysis; 2) Effectiveness of the solution algorithm. 
1) POWER CPS RISK PREDICTIVE MODEL VALIDITY 
ANALYSIS 
Based on the coupled system constructed in this paper, the 
fixed risk transfer probability model and the state transition 
probability model based on the dependent Markov chain 
were employed to predict the power CPS risk area. Table 1 
lists some of the predictions obtained using the exhaustive 
method. 
Table 1 
PARTIAL PREDICTION PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF 
RISK AREA 
Risk area size (including the 
number of nodes) Incidence probability 
Entire 
network 
Information 
layer 
Physical 
layer 
Proposed 
model 
Fixed risk transfer 
prediction model 
2 2 0 0.0289 0.0342 
3 2 1 2.601×10-3 6.332×10-3 
4 
2 2 2.341×10-3 
4.171×10-3 
3 1 3.422×10-3 
5 
3 2 3.98×10-4 
5.167×10-4 
4 1 1.752×10-4 
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7 
4 3 6.089×10-6 
7.417×10-6 5 2 4.172×10-6 
6 1 1.159×10-6 
8 
4 4 5.482×10-6 
2.372×10-6 
5 3 4.035×10-6 
6 2 2.955×10-6 
7 1 0.097×10-6 
9 
5 4 6.437×10-7 
5.538×10-7 
6 3 4.315×10-7 
7 2 1.731×10-7 
8 1 8.691×10-8 
It can be seen from Table 1, for example, when the 
number of fault nodes is 7, the incidence probability 
obtained by fixed risk predication model is 7.417×10-6, the 
results of proposed model can be divided into: 1) when the 
information layer has 4 failt nodes, the physical layer has 3 
failt nodes, the incidence probability is 6.089×10-6. 2) 
when the information layer has 5 failt nodes, the physical 
layer has 2 failt nodes, the incidence probability is 
4.172×10-6. 3) when the information layer has 6 failt nodes, 
the physical layer has 1 failt nodes, the incidence 
probability is 1.159×10-6. According to the dependent 
Markov chain risk region prediction model, the probability 
of occurrence of risk regions of different scales can be 
calculated. By comparing the obtained results with two 
different transition probabilities, it can be determined that 
when the total number of nodes included in the risk region 
is the same, regardless of the distribution of the nodes in 
the information layer and the physical layer, the results 
obtained by using the fixed risk transition probability 
prediction are the same. However, in the process of actual 
system risk propagation, node failure caused by load 
constraint reconfiguration leads to changes in system 
network topology and dynamic power flow, which further 
affects the subsequent risk propagation trend. The fixed 
risk transfer probability ignores the correlation between the 
state of the component nodes, so a deviation of the 
prediction results will occur. This effect is not obvious 
when the risk area is small, but with increasing scale, this 
effect becomes more apparent. Therefore, the prediction 
model in this paper can distinguish between the different 
network node regions, which is beneficial to obtaining 
more accurate prediction results. 
Analysis of the results of state transition probability 
calculation also shows that the probability of occurrence of 
the 8-node risk region with four physical nodes and four 
information nodes is greater than that of some 7-node risk 
regions. The probability of occurrence of the scale risk 
area is mainly due to the strong correlation between some 
nodes in the coupled network. Once one of the nodes fails, 
the other will inevitably fail. 
2) SOLUTION ALGORITHM VALIDITY AND EFFICIENCY 
ANALYSIS 
The five model solution algorithms of ant colony 
optimization (ACO), artificial bee colony algorithm (ABC), 
gravitational search algorithm (GSA), grey wolf 
optimization (GWO), and cross-adaptive grey wolf 
optimization (CAGWO) were selected for comparative 
experiments. The algorithm parameters were set as shown 
in Table 2. 
Table 2  
PARAMETER SETTINGS OF FIVE ALGORITHMS 
Solution 
algorithm 
N Kmax G0 Lmax β ω η 
ACO 120 1000 —— 100 —— —— —— 
ABC 120 1000 —— 100 —— —— —— 
GSA 120 1000 100 —— 20 —— —— 
GWO 40 1000 —— —— —— 8 2 
SAGWO 40 1000 —— —— —— 8 2 
 
The network functional evaluation of the prediction 
results obtained by the five solution algorithms was carried 
out by using the remaining network functional evaluation 
indicators. The evaluation indicators are the maximum 
connectivity rate and load loss of the network. 
● Maximum network connectivity 
The maximum connectivity of the network is an 
important indicator for measuring the connectivity of the 
coupled network. It refers to the probability that one edge 
is randomly selected in the network after the predicted risk 
region is removed. This edge belongs to the largest 
connected domain. In a coupled network with 
interdependence, each node is connected to each other. 
After the risk area is removed, the load reconfiguration is 
performed after the m time step, and when the network 
resumes the absorption state, the maximum functional area 
connected to the network is interdependent.  
The number of edges is denoted by R, then the 
maximum network connectivity Rmax is: 
( )
( )
 
max
1
c-normal p-normali V V
R
R
V V

=
−

                   (24) 
⚫ Load loss indicator 
The load loss degree index refers to the degree of load 
loss of the network after the risk area is removed, and is 
used to evaluate the importance of the risk area. The 
expression is: 
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( )
p-normal p-normal
p-normal
p p
nin+1 i
i V i V
p
ni
i V
L L
L

 

−
=
 

                (25) 
where LP (n+1)i  and  LP ni are the physical node loads 
during the time step n+1 risk area excision and time step n 
risk area excision, respectively. 
Prediction results of the five algorithms are provided for 
comparison, as shown in Fig. 5(a) and (b).  
 
(a) Maximum connectivity of the network 
 
(b) Load loss indicator 
FIG. 5 Functional evaluation of residual network of power CPS 
Figure 5(a) and (b) can be used to conduct a functional 
evaluation of the remaining CPS network after the risk area 
is removed. When the risk area is small, the maximum 
connectivity of the remaining networks obtained by the five 
algorithms is similar. Because the risk spread range is small 
at this time, there are many remaining network work nodes, 
so structural connectivity is not significantly diminished. 
As the proportion of risk areas increases, the results of the 
five algorithms are more obvious. The remaining network 
functionality obtained by the algorithm used in this paper is 
significantly superior to other algorithms. The prediction 
results provide the least harm to the remaining network and 
can retain the maximum connectivity and minimize load 
loss of the remaining network. 
The optimization time of different algorithms for 
different CPS scale is compared in Fig. 6.  
 
FIG. 6 Comparison of solving time of different scale tasks 
When the power CPS is small, the calculation time of the 
five algorithms is similar, indicating that the small scale 
increases the CPS scale and the number of nodes is large. In 
summary, example 1) verifies the superiority of the model 
used in this paper, which can distinguish between the 
different network node regions, getting more accurate 
predictions. It can be seen from example 2), the solution 
algorithm proposed in this paper can adaptively adjust gray 
wolf fitness. The local precocity convergence characteristics 
are changed, the optimization results are quickly converged, 
and the time-consuming aspect presents a significant 
advantage. This means that when the algorithm is applied to 
a large number of nodes of power CPS, the prediction model 
can be solved more efficiently. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A power CPS risk region prediction model based on 
dependent Markov chain was proposed in this paper which 
can distinguish node heterogeneity and capture the 
interdependencies between the physical network and cyber 
network. An improved cross-adaptive grey wolf optimization 
was then used to solve this model, with the ultimate goal of 
predicting the probability of the occurrence of a risk area. 
This paper provides a theoretical reference for preventing the 
spread of risks in real world applications.  
Future work will consider different information network 
topologies and types of transmission services to further 
improve the risk area prediction model. Another interesting 
topic for future study would be to extend this work to 
potential applications in risk region prediction of an 
integrated energy system [23]. 
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